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'i~. ),j2j, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW G. NOKES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
CONTINENTAL MINING & MILLING 
CO., a Corpor.ation, E. G. FRAWLEY, 
President, JOHN DOE, Secretary, GLEN" 
I. CRANDALL, Transfer Agent, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8501 
Brief of Respondent 
STATE~1ENT OF THE FACTS 
THE STA'TEMENT OF FACTS CONTAINED IN APPEL-
LANTS' BRIEF ARE NOT ENTIRELY CORRECT AND, 
THEREFORE, RESPONDENT WILL SET FORTH HIS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THEREAFTER NOTE THE 
POINTS OF SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT. 
Plaintiff, .a resident of Kansas at the time the pur-
chase of the stock was made, was in Salt Lake Cit~,, 
rtah, as a witness in certain condemnation actions in-
volving Pioneer Pipe Line Company, his employer. Pio-
neer Pipe Line Company was represented hy Messrs. 
1 
~ 
,-.\-
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Lowe and Cuthbert (R. 34,44) and, therefore, plaintiff 
had been interviewed by and was acquainted with Messrs. 
Lowe and Cuthbert. At the time the stock transfer was 
negotiated in June, 1954, the uranium boom was at its 
height (R. 45) and the plaintiff who had previously pur-
chased uranium stocks through a discretionary account 
of J. A. Hogle Company (R. 45) advised :Messrs. Lowe 
and Cuthbert of the fact that he would like to make addi-
tional speculations (R. 46). 
~Ir. Cuthbert on the n1orning of June 16, 1954, in-
formed plaintiff that he knew a party who had stock in 
the defendant corporation and that such party might be 
willing to sell this stock (R. -!:5). Plaintiff knew nothing 
of the defendant corporation and Messrs. Lowe and Cuth-
bert advised him that it was an .affiliate of Consolidated 
G" ranium :\lines, Inc., and that the stock was not traded 
nor wa~ there any established n1arket, over-the-counter 
or otherwise (R. -!:5 ). :\Ir. Cuthbert explained to the 
plaintiff that although there was no n1arket for the stock 
he understood that a portion of its assets consisted of a 
block of stock of another ur.aniun1 cmnpany. which on the 
ha~i::; of enrrent market prices, w·ould giYe a book value 
of $6,000.00 to $7,000.00 for 100,000 shares of the defend-
ant corporation (H. -l-;) ). Plaintiff "~as further advised 
that it n1ight tak(' a considerable length of tilue, perhaps 
<'VPn dissolution of the corporation, before he would 
n'<·ein' an~· rdurn for nwney invested (R. -!:5). Plaintiff 
inl'ontwd .:\l(·s~rs. Cuthbert and Lowe that he would in-
V<'st approximately $500.00 in the stork (R. 34,46,54:). 
l\1 r. Cuthbert then c.alled !Ir. l\rigliareio. the owner of the 
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stock, and arranged a ti1ne and place for the negotiation 
for the sale of the stock. 
It is interesting to note that the plaintiff brought up 
the subject of uranium speculation in the conversations 
at the offices of Messrs. Lowe and Cuthbert and also 
suggested the price to be paid for the stock (R. 35) .and 
that other stocks were mentioned (R. 36). The actual 
negotiations and consummation of the sale of the stock 
occurred in the Atlas Building and out of the presence of 
both 2\[r. Cuthbert and Mr. Lowe (R. 38). The plaintiff 
had no knowledge of any infirmity in the stock certificate 
or its ownership at the time he made the purchase of the 
stock (R. 30). The stock certificate was complete and 
regular on its face, properly endorsed with endorsement 
guaranteed and Federal Revenue Stamps attached (Ex. 
1). 
On the 18th day of June, 1954, plaintiff presented the 
certificate to the president of defendant corporation, 
E. G. Frawley, and requested transfer of the stock on the 
books of the corporation (R. 6,12,19). This request was 
refused (R. 7,12). Again on June 19, 1954, plaintiff de-
manded the corporation to transfer the stock to him and 
was again refused (R. 6,7,12). Thereafter, on August 
2, 1954, counsel for plaintiff by letter addressed to the 
secretary of defendant corporation again demanded 
transfer of the stock to plaintiff and was again refused 
(R. 7,12). At the time of each of these demands there 
was no transfer agent for the corporation (R. 5,11). 
'l,he demand for transfer was made at the office of the 
corporation (R. 6,12). 
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After the defendant had refused to transfer the sub-
ject certificate, plaintiff contacted Messrs. Lowe and 
Cuthbert who informed him that there had been a contest 
over the right to the certificate in the Utah State Securi-
ties Commission but that the seller, :Mr. Migliaccio, had 
been successful in such action and the certificate had 
been turned over to him (R. 41, Line 15). ~Ir. Cuthbert 
in fact stated that he felt that the matter of dispute had 
been satisfied by the Attorney General's opinion (R. 46, 
Line 23 ; R. 49, Line 1). In fact, it was his belief that 
the personal animosity existing between Mr. Frawley, 
president of Continental ~lining & :Milling Co., and Mr. 
J\1:igliaccio would not carry over to a third party owner 
(R. 49). 
M:r. Frawley was president of Continental Mining 
& Milling Co. (R. 60) and w.as well acquainted with the 
affairs of the corporation (R. 60,61) and knew the value 
of the stock of such cmnpany (R. 61, Lines 5, 6, 7) and 
that as of October 7, 1954, (R. 66, Lines 26,27,28) the 
stock was worth $4,000.00 ( R. Gi, Lines 22,23,2±,25) and 
that at present it has no value or n1arket (R. 63, Lines 
10,11,12,13,14,15). 
Although in the opinion of plaintiff 1natters which 
oceurred prior to or subsequent to the tr.ansfer of the 
stock rerti fieatt> are innnaterial and irrelevant unless 
shown to have been conununicated to the plaintiff, the 
<ki'Pndnnt has placed such e1nphasis on certain of these 
eiremn~tmwt'~ that an outline of the events would seem 
propPr. Frmn 1950 to the tilne of connnence1nent of this 
action, La\\Tenep .2\1 igliaceio and defendants Continental 
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Mining and Milling Company and E. G. Frawley were 
involved in practically continuous litigation on various 
matters (R. 48,49). There developed a great deal of ani-
mosity between Nir. Frawley and Mr. 1iigliaccio (R. 49). 
In this connection, .a controversy developed between them 
over the release of 100,000 shares of stock in defendant 
corporation by the Utah State Securities Commission. 
The stock was released to the ~Iigliaccios following an 
Attorney General's opinion directing its release to Mr. 
Migliaccio and his wife (R. 41,46,51,52). John W. Lowe 
and Thomas C. Cuthbert had represented the Migliaccios 
as attorneys in these matters (R. 46, 51). On June 11, 
1954, Continental Mining and l\Iilling Company filed a 
complaint in the Federal District Court against the sell-
er of the stock certificate, 11igliaccio, but the said Migli-
accio had not been served with summons and, in fact, the 
filing of the complaint was unknown to the plaintiff or 
any of the interested parties or witnesses in this action 
at the time the sale was consummated (R. 30,50,53). 
Plaintiff was not a party to the action instituted by the 
defendant company and there was no adjudication of 
plaintiff's rights in that action, his rights being specifi-
cally excluded from the court's determination (Defend-
ants' Exs. 3,4). 
PLAINTIFF TAKES ISSUE WITH THE FOLLOWING 
ST A:TEMEN'TS OF FACT AS CONTAINED IN APPEL-
LANTS' BRIEF: 
1. (B.2) "The transfer of the stock was arranged 
for the specific purpose of defeating the corporation's 
rights and under such circumstances that dispel any no-
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tion of a transfer in good faith." There is contained in 
the record no evidence whatsoever as to the purpose of 
the transfer except that plaintiff expected financial gain. 
2. (B.2) " ... Cuthbert .and Lowe were present 
and represented Migliaccio, ... and were advised that the 
corporation intended to institute an action to recover 
the certificate." The evidence shows that Mr. Lowe was 
present but there is nothing in the record to indicate ~1r. 
Cuthbert was also present (R. 51). Further, the state-
ment that ~Ir. Cuthbert was advised that the corporation 
intended to institute an action to recover the certificate 
is incorrect, :Jir. Cuthbert's testimony being that he 
thought the matter had been settled by the Attorney 
General's opinion and did not know of the pendency of 
any suit (R. 46,50). 
3. (B.3) "l\1r. Lowe knew that the action had been 
cmnn1enced." This state1nent is incorrect, the only testi-
mony being that l\Ir. Lowe had been advised by counsel 
for appellants at the ti1ne the stock was released by the 
Securities Couunission that appellants threatened to com-
Inence a lawsuit (R. 53). 
+. (B.3) "Cuthbert knew Xokes was a novice and 
lacking in any knowledge about uranium stock, except 
that he had heard there was money to be n1ade in urani-
lllll ~toek." ':rhe evidence sho"·s that :Jfr. Xokes had been 
di~eu~~ing the uraniu1n 1narket practically daily before 
the pnreha~P and that he had bought smne stocks through 
a di~erd.ionary account with J. A. Hogle & Company. 
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His lack of knowledge was as to the boom in the uranium 
stock market prior to arriving here (R. 36,45). 
5. (B.3) " ... the price .at which it could be pur-
chased was made by Cuthbert and Lowe." The evidence 
is that the price was set by :Mr. Nokes stating that he 
had $500.00 to invest (R. 35,37,46 and 54). 
6. (B.4) " ... it took a United States Marshal 
from the 11th day of June until the 19th day of July to 
discover the whereabouts of Mr. and Mrs. Migliaccio . 
. . . " At no place in the record is there anything suggest-
ing how long it took the :Marshal to serve Mr. Migliaccio, 
the only evidence being that ~Ir. Migliaccio had not been 
served at the time the sale of the stock to Mr. Nokes took 
place (R. 50). 
7. (B.4,5) Appellants' brief states that Mr. Cuth-
bert forgot to telll\Ir. Nokes the substance of the conver-
sation he had with Migliaccio. Mr. Cuthbert's testimony 
on cross-examination explains that the conversation he 
had with :Migliaccio was to the fact that the Migliaccios 
probably could not obtain a transfer of the stock without 
litigation and was based upon the animosity between Mr. 
Migliaccio and l\Ir. Frawley, president of the company, 
and had nothing to do with any belief that there was any 
legal impedirnent to the transfer of the stock and that, 
therefore, that portion of the conversation was not re-
lated to Mr. Nokes (R. 49). 
8. (B.5) "In about an hour's time all of these mat-
ters occurred and Nokes hurried to meet l\1:igliaccio, turn 
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over to him a month's salary, before deductions, and went 
to an office of the defendant Frawley to demand trans-
fer." The record on page 6 contains a request for admis-
sions wherein in paragraph 2C there is a request for ad-
mission that demands for transfer were made on the cor-
poration on June 18, 19 and August 2, 1954. This request 
for admission is admitted by defendants in paragraph 5 
of their answers to request for admissions (R. 12). The 
"hour's time" is therefore enlarged to two days. 
9. (B.5) •· ... Cuthbert and Lowe told Nokes that 
the defendant corporation claimed the stock." The record 
discloses that in reply to ~lr. X oke's question he was 
informed that although the defendant corporation had 
resisted the release of the stock at the Securities Com-
mission, it had failed in its efforts and the stock had been 
delivered to plaintiff's seller. 
10. (B.6) '' ... Federal Court ... adjudicated 
that the corporation was the owner of the stock." The 
decree in the Federal action only adjudicates that the 
corporation's right is paran1ount to the right of the 
l\ligliaccios or that of any persons claiming under them 
with notice or without value (Ex. -1-, R. 42). 
11. (B.G) ~tatt•s that the record does not show 
that the stock wa~ sent to the transfer agent of the corpo-
ration for transfer. The record on page 5 discloses inter-
rogatories to the part~· wherein at interrogatory 1, de-
fendant is asked who the transfer agent of the corpora-
tion wa~ on the dates dmnand for transfer was n1ade. 
The an~\n'rs to the interrogatory disclose that there was 
8 
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no transfer agent on any of the dates the demands for 
transfer were made (R. 11). 
The respondent contends that the decision of the 
trial court in this action in finding that plaintiff was a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any in-
firmity in the stock certificate of the defendant corpora-
tion and that he is entitled to a transfer thereof on the 
books of the corporation was proper and the only 
decision that could be made by the court in view of the 
evidence offered by plaintiff and defendant as to which 
there is no substantial disagreement. Further, the evi-
dence warrants a judgment for damages to the plaintiff 
in the sum of $4,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BOUND BY THE DECISION IN 
THE CASE OF CONTINENTAL MINING & MILLING CO. vs. 
LAWRENCE AND MARIE 0. MIGLIACCIO. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF IS A BON A FIDE PURCHASER OF THE 
STOCK FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY 
INFIRMITY IN HIS TRANSFEROR'S TITLE. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF BY THE PURCHASE OF THE STOCK AC-
QUIRED AN INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT TO THE SHARES 
REPRESENTED BY THE CERTIFICATE. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAM-
AGES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BOUND BY THE DECISION IN 
THE CASE OF CONTINENTAL MINING & MILLING CO. vs. 
LAWRENCE AND MARIE 0. MIGLIACCIO. 
The Federal District Court in the case of Contin-
ental ~fining & Milling Co., plaintiff, vs. Lawrence and 
~Iarie 0. ~1:igliaccio, defendants, Civil C-85-54, United 
States District Court for the District of rtah, specifi-
cally excluded from its decree any determination of the 
rights of any person who claimed the certificate without 
notice of infirmity or who had paid value therefor. 
The Utah Supre1ne Court in Adams 'C. Sih·er Shield 
Jl1iuing & 1llilling Company, 21 P. 2d 886, held that the 
conuuence1nent of a suit did not affect the rights of the 
parties in a transfer of stock. In that case a husband got 
an option to purchase stock from another and a delivery 
of the stock certificate was Inade to him. The option was 
not exercised but in a divorce proceeding he gave the 
stock to his wife, the plaintiff in the action. Plaintiff 
argued that since no action had been connnenced against 
her husband before the transfer, she becmne the absolute 
owner of the stock although she gaye no consideration for 
t lw tr.ansfer. On this proposition, this court said: 
"Respondent argues that Section 6 of the act 
nmkes the Plaintiff the absolute owner of the 
sto<'k and that it was incu1ubent on the Defendant 
under ~Petion 7 to eommenee an action for re-
possession of the stoek before it was transferred 
to Plaintiff even if without consideration. This 
10 
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would make the rights of the p.arties depend en-
tirely upon whether or not an action to recover 
the stock has been commenced at the time of the 
transfer and not on the equitable doctrine of es-
toppel. In other words, if the rights of the parties 
were solely to be determined on whether or not 
a suit has been commenced under Section 7 of the 
act prior to the transfer, then it would not make 
any difference whether the transferee was .a pur-
chaser for value or took with full notice of facts 
that the transfer was wrongful and the transfer 
would be final. We do not believe the Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act was intended to make any 
such change in the law." 
The cases cited by appellants on the point of res 
judicata deserve a word of explanation. Mat hews v. 
Mathews, 102 Utah 428, 132 P. 2d 111, was a case involv-
ing the same p.arties and issues as in two previous cases 
decided adverse to plaintiff, and the court correctly ruled 
that these two previous decisions barred plaintiff's ef-
forts in a third case on the smne matter. The case of 
Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, held that 
the right of persons who were parties to a water hearing 
but whose rights had not been fully determined in that 
hearing were not bound by a reversal of the State Engin-
eer's order rejecting plaintiff's application to appropri-
ate water. In neither of these cases was there involved a 
question of transferee's rights, nor the question of the 
rights of bona fide purchasers without notice. 
The Fnifonn Stock Transfer Act adopts the com-
mon law principal of estoppel of a person to assert the 
invalidity of another's title. 
11 
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In this case, there is no contention made by appel-
lants that the stock represented an overissue or was is-
sued in violation of any provision of the articles or by-
laws of the corporation. The complaint filed in the 
United States District Court (Ex. 3) shows that the stock 
was issued to the Migliaccios pursuant to a lease and op-
tion to purchase mining claims, and that appellants' right 
to recover the stock arose out of appellants failing to pay 
the Migliaccio's $5,000.00 and failing to take possession 
of the mining claims on or before April30, 1950. 
Defendant corporation issued a stock certificate in 
the name of the Migliaccios in February of 1950. This 
certificate was regular on its face and imparted a repre-
sentation of the corporation to anyone seeing it that the 
~Iigliaccios owned the shares represented by the certi-
ficate. Thereafter, in 1950, the corporation rescinded 
the lease and option agreement which gave rise to the 
issuance of the stock, and connnenced an action for its 
rescission in the Fnited States District Court and prayed 
return of the amounts advanced to the :Jligliaccios. This 
case went to the lOth Circuit Court of Appeals and is re-
ported a~ J/ igl iaccio r. Continental JI in ing & IJ!illing 
C<Jm Jmll.1f, 196 F. ~d. 395. At no point in this litigation did 
defendant~ seek to obtain the subject stock certificates, 
wll i<'h tlH~~· knew would lead a prospective purchaser 
to rPiy on l\1 igl iaeeio ·~ owner~hip of the shares in the 
<'o rpo rat ion. Defendants, E'Yl~n though the certificate had 
lH'Pll outstanding OY<'r four years, took no steps to obtain 
a cancellation of tlw ~toek or court order directing the 
e<>rti fi<'atc to be delivered to the corporation for cancella-
12 
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tion until the stock certificate was released by the Utah 
Securities Commission, even though ~the corporation be-
lieved that :Migliaccio was seeking the stock so he could 
sell it (Ex. 3, Par. 9). This conduct estops the defend-
ants from asserting the invalidity of the stock purchased 
by plaintiff. 
In 2 Pomeroy's Equity Juris prudence, Fifth Edition, 
page 1010ff, Section 710, there is a discussion of the gen-
eral proposition of estoppel in relation to priorities of 
assignments. This discussion gives a good background 
of the law prior to the enactment of the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act and in Section 710 (b) this act is specific.ally 
treated. 18 C.J.S. p. 641-2, Sec. 207; 13 Am. Jur. 417, 
Sec. 345; 13 Am. Jur. p. 419, Sec. 347; 11 Fletcher Cyclo. 
Corporations, Perm. Ed., p. 362, Sec. 5169. 
11 Fletcher Cyclo. Corporations, Perm. Ed., p. 359, 
Sec. 5168 states: 
"Sec. 5168. CERTIFICATE AS REPRE-
SENTATION OF VALIDITY, OWNERSHIP 
AND POWER TO CONVEY. 
''A certificate of stock issued by a corpora-
tion having power under its charter to issue cer-
tificates in the form in which such certificate is 
issued, is a continuing affirmation or representa-
tion th.at the stock therein described is valid and 
genuine, and that the person therein named is the 
owner of the stock represented thereby and has 
the capacity to transfer the same. Such state-
ments and representations are made for the ex-
press purpose of inducing, and with the expecta-
tion that they will induce, strangers to purchase 
the stock .and the certificate, and address them-
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
selves to whoever thereafter acquires the certifi-
cates. And subsequent purchasers or pledgees 
of the stock have a right to rely upon them, re-
gardless of the nmnber of transfers that may have 
been made in the meantime, unless they have ac-
tual notice of the invalidity of the certificate, or 
the circumstances are such as to create suspicion, 
and put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry. 
"It follows that the corporation is liable in 
damages to bona fide purchasers or pledgees of 
fictitious or unauthorized certificates who are de-
ceived and injured by relying upon their genuine-
ness, provided they were issued by an officer or 
agent of the corporation acting within the appar-
ent scope of his authority. And it also follows 
that, as against such a purchaser or pledgee, the 
corporation is estopped to deny that the person 
named in the certificate is the owner of the stock 
represented by it, or to deny the validity of the 
stock represented by the certificate, provided it 
has authority and power to issue stock of the 
kind .and character in question.'' 
The Ctah Supre1ne Court in the case of Commercial 
J:a,!l,· of SjJallish Fork r. 8JWllish Fork South Irrigation 
Co., 101 C tah :21!), 153 P. :2d 547. adopts the principles 
a hov<> ~d forth in an action for dmnages involving an 
ovPr-i~~ll<' of water stock. A-\s stated above, the stock 
which i~ th<-' suhjed of this controversy is not .an over-
j:-;:-;u<' of stoek and rouJd ,·alidi~- be issued by the corpora-
tion :-;o it wa~ not void. 
r,,,)(l <':l~t' or HaJikcr .... :· Tnu-;f COJJI])(IJ.',lf of Des ~~Joines 
P. JV. N. Bood. ------ lowa ------· :233 X.,Y. ID-1-. 73 ~l.L.R. 
1-1-21, involvPd an ad ion hy the pledgee of stork against 
t h0 <'orporat ion for transfer of the stock to plaintiff on 
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the books of the corporation. The corporation defended 
that it had not received consideration for the stock in the 
amount of par value thereof, so the stock was void under 
Iowa statute that required receipt of par value for the 
stock before issuance. The court in holding plaintiff to 
be a transferee for value in good faith and without notice 
of any infirmity in the stock held it w.as entitled to have 
the stock transferred on its books. This case and the 
annotation at 73 A.L.R. 1435 comprehensively covers 
the matter of rights of the corporation and bona fide 
purchasers in cases involving want of statutory consider-
ation for its issuance. Although the Nevada Compiled 
Laws, Section 1611 makes the judgment of directors as 
to the value of labor, services or property received for 
the issuance of stock conclusive in the absence of fraud, 
so the impediment in the cases annotated does not arise, 
the holdings of these cases are beneficial in considering 
this c.ase. It is difficult to see how the plaintiff could be 
bound by the principle of res judicata when he was not 
a party to the action and, further, it should be noted that 
no evidence has been adduced indicating that the plain-
tiff had knowledge of the action. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF IS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE 
STOCK FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY 
INFIRMITY IN HIS TRANSFEROR'S TITLE. 
The trial court specifically found that viaintiff pur-
chased the stock in defendant corporation in good faith, 
for value and without notice of any infirmity in his 
transferor's title (R. 76). 
15 
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This court in the case of Stanley v. Stanley, 97 U. 
520, 94 P. 2d 465 and 466, laid down the following rule 
with respect to the appellate review of the findings of 
the trial court in equity cases as follows: 
"The scope of the review on appeal in equity 
cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. 'The 
court is authorized by the State Constitution to 
review the findings of the trial courts in equity 
cases, but the findings of the trial courts on con-
flicting evidence will not be set aside unless it 
manifestly appears that the court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly against the 
weight of proven facts or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence.' Oliver v. 
Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313, 315." 
This case has perhaps become the leading case in 
Utah on this point and is cited consistently as controlling. 
Youngren r. King, 267 P. 2d 913. Perry r. McConkie, 
264 p. 2d 853, 854. 
A review of the record in the present case reveals 
no substantial conflict of fact. The testimony of the 
defendant~· witnesses does not differ in any material 
respect from the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. De-
fendants' onl~· contention is that the testin1ony of their 
own witnesses and of the plaintiff is not worthy of belief, 
and that tht' trial court should have disregarded all of 
the evidence presented by both parties .and ruled in de-
fendants' favor. 
Defendants took the depositions of both ~Iessrs. 
Low<> and Cuthbert prior to trial (R. 53). In the trial 
thp~· wen' called as defendants' witnesses and defendants 
16 
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did not claim any surprise at their testimony nor were 
they examined as hostile witnesses. Appellants in their 
brief do not claim .any surprise at the testimony, but 
argue only that the testimony of the witnesses is not 
worthy of belief. 
In the case of Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 U. 543, 196 
P. 2d 968, 975, this court said: 
"It is the general rule that a party who calls 
a witness vouches for his veracity and cannot 
afterwards impeach the witness, either by the 
testimony of impe.aching witnesses or by argu-
ment to the jury. The rule is subject to some ex-
ceptions, notably where one party must call the 
adverse party as a witness .... On the other hand, 
a party who has called a witness to help prove his 
case, and has vouched for his credibility may not 
thereafter argue to the jury that such witness is 
unworthy of belief." 
The evidence in this action is undisputed that plain-
tiff had no actual notice of .any infirmity in the title of 
Migliaccio to the stock. Appellants argue now that 
Messrs. Cuthbert and Lowe were the agents of the plain-
tiff and of the sellers, citing the general proposition 
that knowledge of .an agent is imputed to his principal. 
Examination of the transaction clearly indicates they 
were not agents of the plaintiff. 
Here, Messrs. Cuthbert and Lowe knew both plain-
tiff and Migliaccio and knew that :Migliaccio held the 
stock. They knew plaintiff wanted to invest in ur.anium 
stocks, and so knowing told plaintiff of the stock and 
arranged a meeting between plaintiff and Migliaccio 
17 
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where the sale was actually consummated. The plaintiff 
and Migliaccio acted for themselves in making the sale 
without the use of agents. The relationship of agency 
between plaintiff and Messrs. Cuthbert and Lowe never 
arose, so plaintiff could not be bound by their knowledge. 
Assu1ning, for the purpose of argument, that an 
agency agreement existed between plaintiff and :Messrs. 
Cuthbert and Lowe, it should be noted that there is no 
evidence that ~1essrs. Cuthbert and Lowe had at the time 
of the transaction herein involved any knowledge of any 
defect in the title to the stock certificate. To the contrary, 
they had successfully defended the title to the stock certi-
ficate before the Securities Commission. Further, if they 
had any knowledge of a defect in title, such knowledge 
would have been acquired prior to the time any agency 
arrangement arose between the plaintiff and :Messrs. 
Cuthbert and Lowe and while in fact they were agents 
of and representing another party and the general rule 
governing such a situation is that previously acquired 
knowledge of an agent is not imputed to the principal, 
especially where the agent owes an obligation to another 
not to connnunieate the fact~ that have con1e to his knowl-
edge. 
:2 A1n . • T ur. ~9-t.. See. 376, states the following: 
.. The rule charging the principal with pre-
vious}~· aequired knowledge of his agent 1nay be 
limited hy the f.act that the knowledge was ac-
quired \Yhile arting for another principal where 
duties to that prineipal still exist. or by the gen-
eral execption that the principal is not charge-
able with knowledge of his agent which he is 
18 
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under a duty not to disclose. It may thus result 
that a principal will be held not chargeable with 
the previously .acquired knowledge of his agent 
in a particular case because of the fact that the 
knowledge was acquired in transacting business 
for another client or by way of a confidential com-
munication, and not because it w.as acquired pre-
viously to the agency although that was the fact. 
:Moreover, if the agent in good faith believes that 
knowledge acquired prior to the agency is imma-
terial, it is not imputed to the principal." 
Appellants in their brief have made quite an issue 
of the fact that Messrs. Lowe and Cuthbert may be the 
agents of the plaintiff. In relation to this question, I 
should like to bring the court's attention to the fact that 
the defendants and appellants did not plead the matter of 
agency, nor direct an issue to such matter in their plead-
ings or argument, the matter of an agent's knowledge be-
ing imputed to the principal logically follows as an af-
firmative defense and under Rule 8 (c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, must be set forth in the pleadings. 
Defendants argue that plaintiff did not purchase the 
stock in good f.aith, based upon the fact that the stock 
was purchased considerably below its book value. There 
was no promise of any profit whatsoever. He was told 
that the stock of defendant corporation was not traded 
on any market, and that the company had not operated 
for approximately five years. The book value quoted 
to him was at most that which he could receive if the 
corporation was dissolved and the assets liquidated. 
The testimony of Mr. Frawley demonstrates the attend-
ant risks of this means of valuation. The officers of a 
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corporation can fritter away the assets of a corporation 
in no time at all, as, for example, the 100,000 shares of 
Consolidated Uranium Mines Inc., stock held by defend-
ant corporation were apparently dissipated. If the fact 
that a stock is purchased substantially below its book 
value were to put a purchaser on a duty to inquire as to 
the title of his sellers, woe unto the purchasers of many 
of the stocks currently traded daily on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Further, it is relevant to note that the 
uranium boom was at its height at the time this stock 
was purchased and there was little or no relation between 
market value and actual value of the stocks. In fact, in 
the discussion, the book value of the subject stock was 
determined by prorating an inflated market value of 
speculative uranium stock (Consolidated U rani urn Mines, 
Inc.) among units of the defendant company's stock 
outstanding. 
Through hindsight it can be seen that the book value 
of the company at the time this purchase was made was 
not the amount stated so any inquiry which plaintiff 
might have n1ade would have shown him that the book 
value was perhaps not even the amount paid, which cer-
tainly would not give ri8e to any inquiry as to the sell-
er's title. 
Plaintiff purchased the stock in question in good 
faith as a uraniun1 speculation, believing that the stock 
n1ight at smne tirne in the future develop into something 
of substantial value where the stock could be sold for a 
gain or a dissolution of the corporation be obtained 
where he 1night realize a gain on his investn1ent. 
20 
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Appellants seeks to cloud the issue by their attempt 
to impute constructive notice of a fact which was only 
established at a much later date in a trial of defendants' 
transferor's title in the courts. Plaintiff had no actual 
notice of any defect, and certainly under the facts in this 
case there can be no constructive notice imputed to him. 
The plaintiff is not required to examine the books 
of the corporation to determine whether or not any ad-
verse clai1n to the stock was asserted. Brown v. Wright, 
48 U. 633, 161 P. 448. 
The record in this case discloses that demand was 
made for transfer of the stock certificate on three sep.a-
rate occasions and that the defendants refused to trans-
fer said certificate (R. 6, R. 31, Lines 3 to 9, Inc.). Al-
though the transfer was refused in each event, there is no 
evidence indicating that the defendants informed the 
plaintiff of their reasons for refus.al except as is stated 
in the testimony as follows (R. 40,41) : 
"Q. What did he say to you~ 
"A. After he belabored me with invective 
he told me he would not transfer the shares. 
"Q. Did he tell you why~ 
"A. I don't know. He was cursing and 
swearing so much I couldn't find .any coherence 
to his conversation. He said it was fraud and I 
was a fraud and the person I bought it from was 
a fraud. He talked on for some number of minutes 
and I was thoroughly disgusted with the conver-
sation. 
"Q. I gather you .at least knew there was 
was something wrong~ 
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"A. I certainly did." 
For the first at the trial of this case the defendants 
claimed that the transferor did not have title to the 
stock certificate. This defense was not given at the time 
of refusal to transfer and plaintiff therefore contends 
that such a defense cannot be raised at the time of trial 
and is barred. The law on this matter is very well estab-
lished and is best set forth in the Idaho case Hulse v. 
Consolidated Quicksilver Mining Corporation, 65 Idaho 
768, 154 P. 2d 149 wherein the court states as follows: 
"It will also be noted that the grounds of 
refusal to transfer the certificate were stated at 
or about the time of the refusal thereof by the 
corporation, and were not the grounds that it 
now asserts for its refusal to transfer the stock. 
"The rule has long been established in this 
state that a corporation which refuses to transfer 
stock upon its books must give at the time its 
reasons for such refusal, and any reasons not so 
given are waiYed. and a defense not asserted at 
the tune of refusal to transfer cannot be raised 
in the first instance at the time of trial of the 
case." 
POIXT III. 
PLAINTIFF BY THE PURCHASE OF THE STOCK AC-
QUIRED AN INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT TO THE SHARES 
REPRESENTED BY THE CERTIFICATE. 
A p]wllant~ in their brief refer to a portion of Sec. 
1617, N<>vada Cmnpiled Ltnn~ 1929 as a1nended. Their 
a~~mnption tltat Xevada Law applies in this case is open 
to ~Primi~ doubt. See Direction Der Discouto-Gesell-
Shaft v. l '. B. Sf('cl Corporation, 267 lT. S. 22, -t51S.Ct. 
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207, 69 L. Ed. 495; Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A. 
2d, 241 12 A.L.R. (2d) 939, 949. Beale in his Treatise 
on the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 192.5 says : 
"The question of who are shareholders in a 
corporation is clearly a question of the internal 
management of the corporation and is therefore 
not to be determined by a foreign state. But the 
share is evidenced by a certificate issued by the 
corporation to certify that the person therein 
named is a stockholder on the books of the corpor-
ation. By business practice this certificate is 
treated as the tangible representative of the stock 
and the owner of the certificate is entitled to be 
registered on the books of the corporation. If this 
certificate happens to be in the foreign state and is 
there transferred, the law of that state must deter-
mine the title to the certificate though it cannot 
determine the title to the share. The foreign 
state having determined the title to the certificate, 
the title to the share follows as a matter of 
course." 
However, it is submitted that a determination of the 
conflicts of law question is not necessary in this matter 
in that the laws of Utah and Nevada are the same. 
Sec. 1617 of the Nevada Compiled Laws, 1928, as 
amended h? Stats. 1937, 10. (Nevada Compiled L.aws 
1931-1941 Supplement), quoted in part in appellant's 
brief reads as follows: 
"Sec. 18. * * * The shares of stock in every 
corporation shall be personal property and shall 
be transferable on the books of the corporation 
in such manner .and under such regulations as 
may be provided in the by laws. The delivery of 
a certificate of stock in a corporation to a bona 
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fide purchaser or pledgee, for value, together 
with a written transfer of the same, or a written 
power of attorney to sell, assign and transfer 
the same, signed by the owner of the certificate, 
shall be a sufficient delivery to transfer the title 
against all parties except the corporation. No 
transfer of stock shall be valid against the corpor-
ation until it shall have been registered upon the 
books of the corporation." 
This was the law in X evada dealing with the transfer 
of stock until 1945 when Nevada enacted the Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act. (Sections 1854 to 1854.23, Nevada 
Compiled Laws, Supplement 1943-1949). 
Section 24 of the Act (Sec. 1854.22 N. C. L.) pro-
vides: 
"All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with 
this act are hereby repealed." 
Sec. 19 of the Act (Sec. 1854.18 X. C. L.) states: 
"This act shall be so interpreted and con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law of those states which enact it." 
An exmuination of the above quoted provisions of 
Section 1617 in the light of enacted provisions of the 
Unifonn Aet leads one to the inescapable conclusion that 
this portion of Section 1617 has been repealed by the 
later enacbnent. 
The fi r~t and third ~entences of the above quoted 
port ion~ of ~Petion 1617 have been superceded b)"'" the 
last paragraph of Section 1 of the Act (Section 1854, 
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N. C. L. which is identical to 16-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953) and which reads as follows: 
"The provisions of this section shall be ap-
plicable although the charter or articles of in-
corporation or code of regulations or by laws of 
the corporation issuing the certificate and the 
certificate itself provide that the shares repre-
sented thereby shall be transferable only on the 
books of the corporation or shall be registered 
by a registrar or transferred by a transfer a-
gent." 
The portion of Section 1617 quoted in appellants' 
brief is superceded by Section 3 of the Act (Section 
1854.02 N. C. L. which is identical with the first two 
subsections of Section 16-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953) 
which provides : 
"Nothing in this act shall be construed as 
forbidding .a corporation ... 
" (a) To recognize the exclusive right of a 
person registered on its books as the owner of 
shares to receive dividends, and to vote as such 
owner; or 
"(b) To hold liable for all calls and assess-
ments a person registered on its books as the 
owner of shares." 
The second sentence of Section 1617 quoted above, 
1s superceded by Sections 1 (1854, N. C. L., which is 
identical with Section 16-3-1 U. C. A. 1953), Section 5 
(1854.04 N. C. L. which is identical with Section 16-3-5, 
U. C. A. 1953), Section 6 (Section 1854.05 N. C. L. which 
is identical with Section 16-3-6, U. C. A. 1953), Section 
7 {Section 1854.06 N.C. L., which is identic.al with Section 
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16-3-7, U. C. A. 1953) and Section 8 (Section 1854.07, 
N. C. L. which is identical with Section 16-3-8, U. C. A. 
1953). 
The portion of Section 1617 on which appellants 
contend the corporation's rights are not effected is that 
which excepts the corporation. Even if the Uniform Act 
had not repealed this section, the clear intent of this 
exception is the same as the exception which is made by 
Section 3 of the Uniform Act quoted above, namely, to 
protect the corporation in the matter of voting divi-
dends .and assessments. The X evada Supreme Court 
has so construed the section in the case of Double 0. 
Mining Co., v. Simrak, 132 P.2d 605, cited in appellants' 
brief, where the court in discussing Section 1611, X. C. L. 
said at page 606 : 
"* * * Primarily, the enactment of Section 
1617, N. C. L., was to provide protection to the 
officers of a corporation in determining the owner-
ship of or right to vote shares of stock. It readily 
appears that under certain circumstances corpor-
ation officials would be confronted with conflict-
ing claims of ownership and the right to vote 
shares of stock and thus long delays or periods 
of uncertainty result so the law has wisely pro-
vided, since a nonjudicial body such as the officers 
of a corporation .are not equipped with the power 
to n1ake a judicial detennination of conflicting 
claims, that they haYe a right to rely upon the 
records in finding who has the right to vote. * * * " 
Section S of the Unifonn Art (1854.07, X. C. L., and 
16-3-8, lltah Code Annotated 1953) provides: 
"Although the transfer of a certificate or of 
shares represented thereby has been rescinded or 
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set aside, nevertheless, if the transferee has pos-
session of the certificate or of a new certificate 
representing part or the whole of the same shares 
of stock, a subsequent transfer of such certificate 
by the transferee, rnediately or immediately, to 
a purchaser for v.alue in good faith, without notice 
of any facts making the transfer wrongful, shall 
give such purchaser an indefeasible right to the 
certificate and the shares represented thereby." 
This section resolves the matters raised by appel-
lants' Brief Points I and II. 
As to the point that plaintiff is bound by the ad-
judication in the Federal Court proceeding, it is well 
to note that this section gives a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice an "indefeasible right" to the shares, 
even though the transfer of shares "has been rescinded 
or set aside" and whether the transfer was made "med-
iately or immediately." Appellants' contention is con-
trary to the clear intent of this statute. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAM-
AGES. 
vVithout question, plaintiff was entitled to have the 
stock certificate transferred to his name on June 18, 
1954, when dmnand was made upon the corporation for 
the transfer of the certificate. Since that date plaintiff 
has been deprived of his rights as a stockholder of said 
corporation, including the rights of a stockholder to in-
vestigate the affairs of the corporation, examine its 
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books, attend meetings and all of the other rights inci-
dent to a stockholder. 
These rights have been deprived the plaintiff by 
reason of the unwarranted refusal of the defendant 
corporation and specifically of its president the defend-
ant E. G. Frawley to transfer the certificate. Most cer-
tainly the court can take note of the fact that the plaintiff 
has been put to considerable expense in order to force 
the accomplishment of the act, to-wit, the transfer of the 
stock certificate. 
In addition, the evidence in this case clearly indicates 
that the stock had a value at the time plaintiff purchased 
the stock and for some time thereafter, specifically to 
October 7, 1954, at which time the defendant Frawley, 
an adverse witness and the person most intimately 
acquainted with the values of the stock testified that the 
stock was worth at least $4,000.00 (R.67), and whereas 
this same party's testimony indicates that the stock 
presently has no value (R.68, Lines 26, 27. 28): 
"Q. The circu1nstances have changed, there-
fore the stock is valueless at this point? 
"A. That is right." 
These staten1ents are adlnissions against interest of 
the defendant corporation and its president, are not con-
tradicted in evidence by an~- other testimony. and there-
fore must giYP weight in detennining da1nages incurred 
h~T thP plaintiff. 
The tPxt :-;tatement contained in Fletcher Cyclopedia 
Corporation:-;, Penuanent Edition, Yol. 12. Pages 4:21-2, 
is as follows : 
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"The measure of damages depends on the 
nature of the action. If the plaintiff sues in con-
version he is entitled to recover the value of the 
stock, as in other cases of conversion. But if he 
claims special damages only and seeks to retain 
the stock, he cannot recover its value. And the 
burden is upon him to establish the amount of 
such special interest. This is true, for example, 
where he does not sue in trover but brings action 
on the case, and under such circumstances if he 
does not prove any special damages he can re-
cover nominal damages only." 
The case of K ingsbttrg v. Riverton - Wyoming Re-
fining Co., 68 Colo. 581, 192 P. 503, involved an action 
for damages for failure to transfer stock of the defend-
ant corporation owned by the plaintiff. Referring to the 
matter of damages, the court states as follows: 
". . . The shares were the property of the 
plaintiff, and refusal to transfer them on his re-
quest was a violation of his rights. Such refusal 
has been held a conversion. Gorham v. Massillion 
S. & I. Co., ... 120 NE 467. The plaintiff was 
entitled, in any event, to nominal damages. The 
finding against him on that issue was error." 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the entire proceedings of the law in 
relation thereto shows that the evidence undisputably 
supports the trial court's determination that plaintiff 
was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of 
any infirmity and is entitled to the transfer of the stock 
certificate in question. Further, the defenses asserted 
at the time of trial were not asserted at the time plaintiff 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
demanded transfer of the stock and, therefore, are 
barred. 
With relation to defendant's contention of agency, 
there is no proof of agency or that the purported agents 
had any knowledge of any infirmity that could be im-
puted to the plaintiff and, therefore, it is respectfully 
submitted that the judgment of the trial court in this 
respect be affirmed and that plaintiff be awarded dam-
ages. 
IRVING H. BIELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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